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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's recent invigoration of federalism doctrine has
revived a question that had long lain dormant in constitutional law:
whether and to what extent federalism limits apply to exercises of the
Treaty Power. In the days before the famous "switch in time that saved
nine," the Court in Missouri v. Holland upheld a statute passed by
Congress to implement a treaty even though it assumed that the statute
would exceed Congress's legislative power under Article I in the
absence of the treaty.' The significance of this holding abated
considerably when the Court embraced a broader interpretation of the
Commerce Power.2 The Court's recent decisions striking down federal
statutes as exceeding the Commerce Power for the first time since the
New Deal have revived the question of Congress's power to implement
treaties by enacting statutes that cannot be made in the absence of a
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I am grateful to David Golove,
Vicki Jackson, Mark Tushnet, and David Sloss for very helpful comments on an earlier version of
this paper, and to Susan Bandes for her generous and thoughtful response. I am also grateful for
the research assistance of Marye C. Cherry.
1. 252 U.S. 416, 432-33 (1920).
2. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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treaty. Scholars have argued that Missouri v. Holland should be
rethought in the light of such decisions as United States V. Lopez,3 while
others have defended Missouri v. Holland.4
One important branch of the Court's recent federalism jurisprudence
is that relating to state sovereign immunity. In Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida,5 the Court held that Congress may not abrogate the
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant to its Commerce
Power, reversing Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.6 In Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,7 the
Court held that Congress's abrogation of Eleventh Amendment
immunity in the federal patent laws was also unconstitutional. These
decisions reaffirmed the holding of Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer' that Congress
may abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment. But in Florida Prepaid, the Court held that the
abrogation of immunity in the patent laws did not satisfy the
"congruence and proportionality" requirement of City of Boerne v.
Flores.9 The subsequent decisions in Kimel v. Florida Board of
Regents" and Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v.
Garrett," striking down the abrogation of state sovereign immunity in
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and in Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, respectively, confirmed that the
window left open by Fitzpatrick is narrow. And Alden v. Maine12
established that states enjoy a constitutional immunity from suit in their
own courts coextensive with their immunity from suit in federal courts.
These decisions have led some scholars to consider whether the
Treaty Power provides an alternative basis for abrogating the states'
sovereign immunity. An affirmative answer has been suggested with
respect to intellectual property. 3 The United States is a party to several
3. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American
Federalism, Part II, 99 MICH. L. REV. 98 (2000); Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and
American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390 (1998) [herinafter Bradley, Treaty Power and
Federalism 1].
4. See, e.g., David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of
the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075 (2000); Carlos Manuel
Vdzquez, Breard, Printz and the Treaty Power, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1317, 1338-1343 (1999).
5. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
6. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
7. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
8. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
9. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
10. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
11. 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001).
12. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
13. See Peter S. Meneil, Economic Implications of State Sovereign Immunity from
[Vol. 42:713
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international agreements that require the protection of certain forms of
intellectual property. The treaties also require parties to afford certain
types of remedies when the protected rights have been infringed.
Scholars have argued that the failure to afford certain remedies against
states might violate these treaties. 4 Some argue further that Congress
has the power to implement these treaties by authorizing remedies
against states that would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment in the
absence of the treaties. 5 This paper focuses on the latter question. It
considers whether state sovereign immunity constrains Congress's
power to authorize remedies against states pursuant to the Treaty Power.
I am among those who have defended the holding of Missouri v.
Holland that Congress may pass laws necessary to implement treaties
even if the laws would exceed Congress's legislative power in the
absence of a treaty. 6 Nevertheless, I conclude here that Congress's
power to implement treaties is not exempt from the federalism
limitations reflected in the doctrine of state sovereign immunity.
The Court's recent state sovereign immunity decisions are, to put it
mildly, controversial. The four dissenting Justices have indicated that
they regard those decisions as so indefensible that they will never treat
them as valid precedents. 7 To say that scholars, too, dispute these
decisions is to understate matters severely. 8 Most Eleventh Amendment
scholars espouse an interpretation that would obviate the issue under
discussion here. Under this view, the Eleventh Amendment does not
apply at all to cases arising under federal law, and the states' sovereign
Infringement of Federal Intellectual Property Rights, 33 LOy. L.A. L. REV. 1399, 1460-64
(2000); John O'Connor, Note, Taking TRIPS to the Eleventh Amendment: The Aftermath of the
College Savings Cases, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1003, 1031-40 (2000). Cf Cory Eichhom, Comment,
Eleventh Amendment Immunity Jurisprudence in an Era of Globalization: The Tension Between
State Sovereign Rights and Federal Treaty Obligations, 32 INTER-AMERICAN L. REV. 523 (2001)
(arguing more broadly for inapplicability of Eleventh Amendment to treaty-based claims). But see
Mitchell N. Berman, Anthony Reese & Ernest A. Young, State Accountability for Violations of
Intellectual Property Rights: How to "Fix" Florida Prepaid (And How Not To), 79 TEX. L. REV.
1037 (2001).
14. See Menell, supra note 13, at 1466; Berman, Reese & Young, supra note 13, at 1188.
15. Menell, supra note 13, at 1461. But see Berman, Reese & Young, supra note 13, at 1188-
95.
16. See Vdzquez, supra note 4.
17. See Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 653 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
18. Professor Hill has recently published a rare defense of state sovereign immunity. Alfred
Hill, In Defense of Our Law of Sovereign Immunity, 42 B.C. L. REv. 485 (2001). He states that
the only other academic who believes sovereign immunity to be of constitutional dimension is
David P. Currie. Id. at 487 n.1 (citing David P. Currie, Exparte Young After Seminole, 72 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 547, 547-48 (1997)). For a lengthy "partial list of academics who argue that sovereign
immunity has no sound basis in law," see id. Insofar as stare decisis can be regarded as a sound
basis for a constitutional doctrine, some of us might quibble with our inclusion in the list.
20021
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immunity is at best a matter of federal common law that may be
abrogated by Congress under any of its legislative powers. For the sake
of our northern woods, I do not propose to reexamine that issue here. 9 I
will assume that, as a matter of federal constitutional law, the states are
entitled to sovereign immunity even in suits based on federal law, and
that this immunity may be abrogated under the Fourteenth Amendment
but not under provisions of Article I unrelated to treaty
implementation. 2 The question I discuss is, then, a conditional one:
Assuming our Constitution affords such immunity, does it permit
Congress to abrogate the immunity when it acts to implement a treaty?
I. BACKGROUND
The evolution of state sovereign immunity doctrine is well-trod
ground. For present purposes, it suffices to recall a few central
propositions.
The Constitution does not mention state sovereign immunity. It
provides that the jurisdiction of the federal courts extends to cases
between a state, or citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or
subjects. 2 ' Relying on the latter provision, the Supreme Court in
Chisholm v. Georgia held that a South Carolina citizen seeking to
recover a debt could maintain an action in the Supreme Court against
the state of Georgia.22 That holding produced a "shock of surprise, ' 23
and the Eleventh Amendment was speedily adopted in response. The
Amendment provides that "the judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State,
or by citizens or subjects of any Foreign State. 24
It is apparent that the Amendment means either more or less than
what it says. 25 There would appear to be no reason to prohibit suits in
federal court by citizens of a different state but to permit such suits if
19. Cf. College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board,
527 U.S. 666, 688 (1999) (stating that the "now-fashionable revisionist accounts of the Eleventh
Amendment" have been set forth in Supreme Court opinions "in a degree of repetitive detail that
has despoiled our northern woods").
20. The power to implement treaties may be regarded as an Article I power insofar as it is
based on the Necessary and Proper Clause.
21. U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 2.
22. 2 U.S. 419 (1793).
23. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
25. But cf Lawrence Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L.
REv. 1342 (1989) (defending a literal interpretation of the Amendment).
[Vol. 42:713
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brought by a state's own citizens. A suit against a state by its own
citizens could be maintained in federal court only if there existed a non-
diversity basis of jurisdiction, such as federal question jurisdiction. But
if the Constitution permitted a state's own citizens to maintain in federal
court an action arising under federal law, why would it prohibit a citizen
of a different state to maintain such an action? Either the Amendment
permits suits arising under federal law even when brought by citizens of
another state or of a foreign state, despite the text appearing to prohibit
such suits, or it prohibits suits arising under federal law even if brought
by a state's own citizens, even though the Amendment's text does not
reach such suits.
The Court faced this question in Hans v. Louisiana,26 and it opted for
the broader interpretation. The Court's holding that the Amendment
applies to suits arising under federal law is the source of the great
controversy surrounding the Amendment. The holding appears to be in
tension with the basic maxim of political science that the judicial power
of any well-constructed government must be coextensive with the
legislative.27 The Constitution imposes a number of legal obligations on
the states, and it authorizes the enactment of laws and the conclusion of
treaties placing additional obligations on the states.28 Under Hans,
however, states cannot be sued in federal court without their consent for
violation of these obligations.
Largely because of this problem, scholars have argued forcefully that
Hans was wrongly decided. The prevailing view among scholars is that
the Amendment was never intended to reach suits arising under federal
law.29 Chisholm v. Georgia, after all, was a diversity action. Under the
so-called diversity interpretation, the Amendment withdraws the
jurisdiction that Article III conferred over suits between a state and
citizens of another state (or of a foreign state), leaving intact the clause
26. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
27. See THE FEDERALISTNO. 80, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961);
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
28. The scope of this power under current doctrine turns on the case law that has developed
under New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898
(1997). These cases appear to hold that statutes imposing obligations on the states are valid as
long as the same obligations are imposed on similarly situated individuals. Whether a statute
would be invalid if it singled out the states for regulation was left open in Reno v. Condon, 528
U.S. 141, 151 (2001). Whether the doctrine of these cases applies to exercises of the Treaty
Power is addressed, and an affirmative answer tentatively reached, in Vdzquez, supra note 4. But
cf. Martin S. Flaherty, Are We To Be a Nation?, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1277 (1999) (concluding
otherwise).
29. For a partial list of scholars who embrace the so-called diversity interpretation, see Carlos
Manuel Vdzquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J. 1683, 1685-86 n.7
(1997).
2002]
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of Article III authorizing jurisdiction over suits arising under federal
law. The Amendment, so construed, would have no application to a suit
brought against a state based on federal law, whether brought by the
state's own citizen or a citizen of a different state. State sovereign
immunity might nevertheless exist as a common law doctrine quite
separate from the Eleventh Amendment, but, according to adherents of
the diversity view, this immunity would in any event be subject to
repeal by Congress under any of its powers. The judicial power would
be potentially coextensive with the legislative.
At one point, the Supreme Court was evenly divided on whether to
overrule Hans and adopt the diversity interpretation. Newly-appointed
Justice Scalia reserved judgment on the issue, noting that the question
was complex.3" In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., he decided to adhere
to Hans. The question, as he viewed it, was whether a waiver of state
immunity in federal question cases was "implicit in the constitutional
scheme."'" He emphasized that "[u]ndoubtedly the Constitution
envisions the necessary judicial means to assure compliance with the
Constitution and laws,"32 but it does not follow, in his view, that the
Constitution authorizes private suits against the states. He noted that the
Amendment had long been construed to permit suits against states by
the United States, as well as private suits against state officers seeking
prospective relief from violations of federal law, and private suits
seeking damages from state officers.33 These other remedies were, in his
view, all that was "necessary" to assure the states' compliance with their
federal obligations. He went on to note that, even if he was wrong about
what was implicit in the constitutional plan, "the question is at least
close," '34 and the case for overruling Hans fails on stare decisis
grounds.35 Thus, Justice Scalia did not so much defend the correctness
of Hans as an original matter as hold that overruling the decision was
unjustified given its pedigree and the fact that its effects were not
problematic in light of the other available mechanisms for enforcing the
federal obligations of the states.
In Union Gas, Justice Scalia was writing in dissent. The majority in
that case held that Eleventh Amendment immunity could be abrogated
by Congress under any of its Article I powers, thus virtually adopting
30. Welch v. Texas Department of Highways and Public Transportation, 483 U.S. 468, 496
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
31. 491 U.S. at 33.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 34.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 34-35.
[Vol. 42:713
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the diversity interpretation. This holding was short-lived, however. With
the replacement of Justice Marshall by Justice Thomas, there were five
votes for the Hans view, and a five-Justice majority quickly overruled
Union Gas in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,36 endorsing Justice
Scalia's analysis.37 The Court reaffirmed the holding of Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer that Congress may abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity
pursuant to its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, but it held
that this abrogation power did not extend to "antecedent" provisions of
the Constitution, such as the Commerce Power.
Seminole Tribe was followed by Alden v. Maine, in which the Court
held that the states enjoy a constitutional immunity from being
subjected to suit in their own courts without their consent. The Court
made it clear that the Eleventh Amendment, which in its terms restricts
only federal jurisdiction, reflects a broader, preexisting doctrine of state
sovereign immunity having constitutional stature. As noted above, the
Court went on in Florida Prepaid, and later in Kimel and Garrett, to
strike down a series of statutes as exceeding the congressional power to
abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court's narrow construction of that clause
has led some scholars to ask whether the Treaty Power supplies a more
promising basis for congressional abrogation of state sovereign
immunity.
II. MIssoURI V. HOLLAND AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS EXCEPTIONALISM
The best doctrinal case for exempting exercises of the Treaty Power
from state sovereign immunity relies on a reading of Missouri v.
Holland38 as establishing that federalism-based constitutional limits do
not apply to the Treaty Power. Missouri v. Holland has been described
as an example of foreign affairs exceptionalism: the idea that ordinary
constitutional principles do not apply in the area of foreign affairs. 9
Critics of such exceptionalism have argued that Missouri v. Holland
should be rethought. The federalism limits that the Court articulated in
such cases as United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison, they
have argued, should apply equally to exercises of the Treaty Power.4"
36. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
37. 517 U.S. at 62-66.
38. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
39. See generally Curtis Bradley, A New American Foreign Affairs Law?, 70 U. COLO. L.
REv. 1089, 1104-07 (1999).
40. See Bradley, Treaty Power and Federalism I, supra note 3.
2002]
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Anti-exceptionalism in foreign affairs law has much to commend it.4
The Constitution in some respects explicitly addresses matters of
foreign affairs differently from domestic matters. For example, it
establishes a different method for making treaties than for making
statutes. But, where it does not, there would appear to be little
justification for resolving legal issues under wholly different standards
just because they touch upon foreign affairs. My conclusion here that
the Treaty Power is not exempt from state sovereign immunity is based
on my conviction that our Constitution is anti-exceptionalist with
respect to mechanisms for ensuring compliance with treaties. In this
section, I explain why I defend the holding of Missouri v. Holland
despite my basic agreement with the anti-exceptionalism of its critics.
Missouri v. Holland was decided in the days when the Court
interpreted the Commerce Clause comparatively narrowly. The Court
upheld a statute regulating the taking of migratory birds as an
implementation of a treaty addressing the same subject, even though
similar statutes had been struck down by lower courts before there was
such a treaty, and the Court assumed for purposes of argument that the
statute would not be valid in the absence of the treaty. 2 The decision in
Missouri thus stands for the proposition that a statute may be a valid
exercise of the Treaty Power even if it is not a valid exercise of
Congress's other Article I powers.
Critics of the decision have characterized the holding as
exceptionalist, describing it as a holding that the federalism limitations
that apply to other constitutional provisions do not apply to the Treaty
Power.43 But this characterization is inapt. Missouri simply recognized
that the Treaty Power is a separate head of federal legislative power.
The Court in Missouri treated the Treaty Power in exactly the same way
as Congress's other legislative powers. In no other context are the
limits of one power applicable to another power. In United States v.
Lopez," for example, the Court held that a statute does not fall within
the Commerce Power on the basis of the regulated activity's effect on
interstate commerce unless the regulated activity itself is commercial.45
There is no reason to regard this limitation on the Commerce Power as
applicable to the Patent and Copyright Power or the Bankruptcy Power
41. See Carlos Manuel Vfzquez, W(h)ither Zschernig?, 46 VILL. L. REv. 1259, 1304 & n.245
(2001).
42. 252 U.S. at 433-35.
43. See Bradley, Treaty Power and Federalism I, supra note 3, at 393.
44. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
45. See Vdzquez, supra note 4, at 1330-31 & n.42.
[Vol. 42:713
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or any other head of legislative power. Accordingly, in United States v.
Morrison, after holding that the Violence Against Women Act exceeded
the Commerce Power, the Court went on to examine whether the statute
fell within Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. 6
The fact that the statute exceeded the Commerce Power did not obviate
the Fourteenth Amendment issue. If the statute had been defended as an
exercise of the Treaty Power, the Court should similarly have gone on
to examine whether the statute was valid under that power.47 There
would have been no greater reason to regard the Commerce Clause
holding as dispositive of the Treaty Power issue than of the Fourteenth
Amendment issue. The three are separate and independent powers.
Missouri thus does not treat the Treaty Power exceptionally by holding
that it is not subject to the limits found in the other heads of federal
legislative powers. It would have been exceptional to hold otherwise.48
The Treaty Power does appear to differ from the other powers in that
it does not appear to be subject to any substantive (i.e., subject matter)
limits.49 Unlike the other powers, the limits of the Treaty Power are
limits of form (there must be an international agreement) and structure
(the treaty must receive the consent of two-thirds of the Senate). The
absence of subject matter limitations has given rise to a concern that the
Treaty Power might be used to circumvent the carefully crafted
limitations on federal legislative power reflected in the other provisions
of Article I, Section 8.50 There have been proposals to read subject
matter limitations into the Treaty Power. Some have relied on the
statement in Missouri that the statute in that case involved "a national
interest of very nearly the first magnitude"'" to suggest that a statute is
valid under the Treaty Power only if it regulates a matter of national
rather than local interest. Others have said that the Treaty Power extends
only to matters that are properly the subject of international
negotiation 52 or matters of international concern.53 Even if these limits
46. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
47. An amicus brief did argue that the Violence Against Women Act was a valid exercise of
the Treaty Power, see Brief of Amici Curiae on Behalf of International Law Scholars and Human
Rights Experts at 2, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (No. 99-0029), but the Court
disregarded the argument, presumably because it was not raised by a party.
48. When the parallel argument was advanced with respect to the Spending Power, it was
rejected there as well. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
49. But cf. the Spending Power.
50. See Bradley, Treaty Power and Federalism I, supra note 3.
51. 252 U.S. at 435.
52. Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 296 (1890).
53. Charles Evans Hughes, Remarks, Limitations of the Treaty-Making Power of the United
States in Matters Coming within the Jurisdiction of the States. 23 PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L LAW
2002]
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were read into the Constitution, I doubt that they would properly be
regarded as judicially enforceable. If a matter is addressed in a treaty
negotiated by the President with another nation and approved by two-
thirds of the Senate, the courts likely would (and should) regard it as a
matter of national and international concern.
If the absence of subject matter limits does make the Treaty Power
exceptional, the exceptional treatment is no doubt related to another
textual difference between treaties and statutes. Statutes require the
affirmative approval of the President and a majority of both Houses of
Congress, or of two-thirds of both Houses without the President.
Treaties, on the other hand, require the approval of the President plus
two-thirds of the Senate. The requirement of the consent of a
supermajority of the Senate is a structural safeguard for treaties that
does not exist for statutes. This safeguard protects the states (and the
nation) from abuse of the Treaty Power. It obviously served as a
particular protection of state interests in the years before the
Seventeenth Amendment was adopted, when Senators were appointed
by state legislatures. Even today, however, the requirement of consent
by two-thirds of the Senate makes it highly unlikely that the Treaty
Power will be used to circumvent otherwise applicable limitations on
federal legislative power. Indeed, the effect of the supermajority
requirement has been to make it more difficult to conclude treaties than
statutes on matters clearly -within the federal legislative power. As a
result, some important international agreements, including many in the
area of international trade, have not taken the form of Article II treaties,
but have instead attained their legal force through the enactment of an
ordinary statute passed under the- Commerce Power. Additionally, the
Senate's solicitude for state 'interests is reflected in the federalism
understandings it has attached to numerous treaties, stating that the
treaties will be implemented by the states to the extent that they relate to
matters over which the states have traditionally exercised legislative
jurisdiction."
In defending Missouri v. Holland's basic holding that there are no
federalism-based subject matter limitations on Congress's power to
implement treaties, I do not mean to suggest that the decision is wholly
unproblematic from a federalism perspective. Some aspects of the
decision may require doctrinal refinement. Specifically, the Court in
Missouri upheld the statute even though the treaty involved did not
require the United States to enact any statute at all. The treaty merely
194 (1929).
54. On these understandings, see Vizquez, supra note 4, at 1354-59.
[Vol. 42:713
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required the parties to "propose" legislation to their legislatures.5 When
a treaty does not require the enactment of legislation, but merely
encourages it, it may be defensible to hold that the relevant legislation
must be proposed to the state legislatures unless it would fall within the
federal government's legislative jurisdiction in the absence of a treaty.
The principal reason the Founders made treaties the supreme law of the
land was to avoid violations of international law by the United States. 6
It was presumably for the same purpose that Congress was given the
power to implement non-self-executing treaties. The failure of Congress
to pass implementing legislation would not produce a violation of a
treaty. that merely required the United States to "propose" such
legislation.57
This problem is more acute today than it was when the Court decided
Missouri v. Holland. Today, the United States is party to many treaties
that include provisions that are highly general and aspirational. The UN
Charter, for example, establishes as one of the organization's purposes
the encouragement and promotion of respect for human rights.5" Would
a treaty provision committing the United States in general terms to
promote respect for human rights authorize Congress to enact any law
in the area of human rights intended to promote such rights?59 Perhaps
today such a treaty would not be ratified without a federalism
understanding. But the effect of such understandings is disputed, and, in
any event, many treaties were ratified in the days before Lopez and
Morrison without such understandings.
Thus, even if Missouri survives Lopez, the Court will very likely
have to articulate doctrine concerning the circumstances in which a
treaty will support a statute. What that doctrine should look like is a
topic for another day.' The point here, is simply that Missouri v.
55. See 252 U.S. at 431.
56. See Carlos Manuel Vizquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1160-61 (1992).
57. On the other hand, the Founders also allocated the treaty-making and treaty-implementing
power to the federal government to harness the negotiating power of the nation as a whole the
better to extract beneficial commitments from other countries. To hold that a certain category of
treaty may only be implemented by the states could hamper the nation's ability to extract such
promises, to the ultimate detriment of the nation as a whole. I do not here endorse any particular
doctrinal answer to the problem identified in the text.
58. UN CHARTER art. 1, para. 3.
59. For an affirmative answer, see Eichhorn, supra note 13.
60. For the reason discussed in note 57, supra, the Court may well settle on a line between
vague provisions (such as our hypothetical provision based on the UN Charter) and specific
provisions (such as that involved in Missouri), rather than between mandatory and non-mandatory
provisions. Professors Berman, Reese and Young appear to assume that, even if the Eleventh
'Amendment did not apply to exercises of the Treaty Power, a statute would be valid under the
2002]
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Holland was right in declining to read the limitations of the other heads
of legislative power into the Treaty Power.
III. TREATIES AND STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Relying on a broad reading of Missouri v. Holland, some scholars
have maintained that the Treaty Power should no more be subject to the
federalism limits reflected in the Eleventh Amendment than to the limits
articulated in such cases as Lopez and Morrison. Thus, they argue,
Congress should be free to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity and subject states to monetary liability for infringing
intellectual property rights to the extent such remedies are required by
treaties such as the Berne Convention and TRIPS.6 1 Because the
argument has yet to be affirmatively presented in any detail, I shall
begin in section A with a presentation of what I regard as the strongest
case for concluding that Congress may abrogate state sovereign
immunity pursuant to the Treaty Power. I shall then explain in section B
why I do not in the end endorse that conclusion.
I present the pro-abrogation argument in its most limited, and hence
presumably its strongest, form. Thus, the argument I provisionally
defend in this section is that Congress has the power to abrogate state
sovereign immunity under the Treaty Power, not that state sovereign
immunity is categorically inapplicable to exercises of the Treaty Power.
I assume that the same clear-statement rule applies to abrogation under
the Treaty Power as to abrogation under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Additionally, to avoid the problem I noted at the end of Part II, I shall
assume that the relevant treaty explicitly requires remedies that would
be barred by state sovereign immunity. As noted above, however, under
some readings of Missouri, a statute affording remedies for treaty
violations might be valid even if the treaty being implemented did not
technically require the specific remedy. Indeed, the statute providing the
remedy might be valid even if the treaty said nothing about remedies, as
long as the remedies could be regarded as a "necessary and proper"
Treaty Power only to the extent the statute affords a remedy required by the treaty. This may be a
desirable rule, but the Court has yet to articulate the need for such a tight nexus between the treaty
and the implementing statute. Missouri v. Holland seems to reject the requirement, for it upheld a
statute that was not required by the treaty.
61. The obligations imposed by these agreements are discussed in detail in Menell, supra note
13, and Berman, Reese & Young, supra note 13. I shall assume here that the agreements require
the United States to afford remedies that would be barred by state sovereign immunity doctrine, if
the latter doctrine were applicable. But cf Berman, Reese & Young, supra note 13 (suggesting
that alternative remedies not barred by state sovereign immunity doctrine, such as suits by the
federal government, may well suffice under these agreements).
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means to enforce the primary obligations set forth in the treaty.6 2
Most importantly, I shall assume that the treaty being implemented is
an Article II treaty, ratified by the President with the consent of two-
thirds of the Senate. Many of the "treaties" often invoked as sources of a
congressional power to abrogate state sovereign immunity are actually
congressional-executive agreements. They are international agreements
that have not received the consent of two-thirds of the Senate, but have
been given legal force through the enactment of a statute signed by the
President with the affirmative votes of a majority of both Houses. The
constitutionality of this mechanism for concluding and giving force to
international agreements has been the subject of extensive scholarly
commentary.6" I do not dispute here the prevailing view that
congressional-executive agreements are constitutional. I do, however,
question the broad claim that such agreements are interchangeable with
Article II treaties in all respects. In my view, such agreements are valid
only to the extent they fall within one of the heads of legislative power
other than the Treaty Power. I have defended the holding of Missouri v.
Holland in part on the ground that federalism is sufficiently protected
by the structural safeguard of consent by two-thirds of the Senate. The
strongest argument for exempting exercises of the Treaty Power from
the strictures of state sovereign immunity also relies on this safeguard.
Because this safeguard does not operate with respect to congressional-
executive agreements, the case for exempting such agreements from
state sovereign immunity is weaker than the case for exempting Article
II treaties.
Scholars have suggested broadly that the Eleventh Amendment does
not apply in the area of foreign affairs.' The Executive Branch has
advanced this argument in the lower courts. .65 It has also advanced the
62. I shall also assume that the treaties at issue are non-self-executing and thus require
implementation by statute. My conclusion here that Congress may not abrogate state sovereign
immunity in implementing non-self-executing treaties means afortiori that the treaty-makers may
not abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to self-executing treaties.
63. See, e.g., Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Constitutional Method, 79
TEX. L. REV. 961 (2001); John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of
Congressional-Executive Agreements, 99 MICH. L. REV. 757 (2001); David M. Golove, Against
Free-Form Formalism, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1791 (1998); Michael D. Ramsey, Executive
Agreements and the (Non) Treaty Power, 77 N.C. L. REV. 134 (1998); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking
Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation,
108 HARV. L. REV. 1221 (1995); Bruce Ackerman & David M. Golove, Is NAFTA
Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 801 (1995).
64. See Mennell, supra note 13, at 1460-61.
65. See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 30-32, Republic of Paraguay v. Allen,
134 F.3d 622(4th Cir. 1998) (No. 96-2770), cert. denied sub nom. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S.
371 (1998). Cf. Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, Breard and the Federal Power to Require Compliance
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somewhat more limited argument that the Eleventh Amendment does
not apply to the War Power.66 The First Circuit adopted the latter
position in upholding an abrogation of state sovereign immunity, post-
Seminole Tribe.67 The Seventh Circuit has expressly rejected the
position.6" I will not comment here on the argument that there is a broad
exception from ordinary state sovereign immunity principles for statutes
that relate to foreign affairs, except to note that the reasons that lead me
to reject a narrower exception for exercises of the Treaty Power appear
to doom the broader argument afortiori.
A. The Strongest Case for Concluding that Congress May
Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity Under the Treaty Power
There is little support in state sovereign immunity doctrine for an
exemption for exercises of the Treaty Power. The Court held in
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives
Congress the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity to "enforce"
that Amendment. In Union Gas, the Court recognized an abrogation
power under the Commerce Power as well, but this decision was
overruled in Seminole Tribe. The Court said that the abrogation power
does not extend to "antecedent" provisions of the Constitution (meaning
provisions that antedate the Eleventh Amendment). Because the Treaty
Power was conferred in the original unamended Constitution, the recent
state sovereign immunity decisions do not support a Treaty-based
abrogation power.69 Support for a treaty-based abrogation power must
With ICJ Orders of Provisional Measures, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 683, 688 (1998) (characterizing
this argument as "bold").
66. See Brief of the United States as Intervenor at *5- 15, Velasquez v. Frapwell, 994 F. Supp.
993 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (No. IP 96-0557-C H/G); Brief of the United States as Intervenor at 6-17,
Velasquez v. Frapwell, 165 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1998) (Nos. 98-1547, 98-2034); Brief of the United
States as Intervenor at 6-17, Palmatier v. Michigan Dept of State Police (6th Cir. Dec. 15, 1997)
(No. 97-1982); Reply Brief for the United States as Intervenor at 2-5, Palmatier v. Michigan
Dept. of State Police (No. 97-1982) (6th Cir. Feb. 18, 1998).
67. See Diaz-Gandia v. Dapena-Thompson, 90 F.3d 609, 616 (1st Cir. 1996); see also In re
Sacred Heart Hospital, 133 F.3d 237, 245 (3d Cir. 1998) (Roth, concurring).
68. Velasquez v. Frapwell, 165 F.3d 593 (7thCir. 1998).
69. Susan Bandes writes that my interpretation of the recent sovereign immunity cases as
distinguishing between pre- and post-Eleventh Amendment provisions of the Constitution, while
"defensible," is "by no means the only possible" one. Susan Bandes, Treaties, Sovereign
Immunity, and "The Plan of the Convention," 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 743, 745-46 (2002). In her view,
the recent decisions might require instead a clause-by-clause determination of Congress's power
to abrogate state sovereign immunity. Such an approach seems to me to be hard to square with the
Court's approach in these recent cases. In holding in Seminole Tribe that the abrogation power
does not extend to the Indian Commerce Clause, the Court did not pause to ask whether there was
any special federal interest in Indian Commerce that warranted an abrogation power under that
clause. This is particularly noteworthy in light of the fact that, in rejecting the State's argument
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be found instead in Treaty Power doctrine.
The case for concluding that Congress may abrogate state sovereign
immunity pursuant to the Treaty Power derives some doctrinal support
from Missouri v. Holland. Some scholars have described the holding of
that case in broad terms, suggesting that it holds that there are no
federalism-based limits on the Treaty Power.70 State sovereign
immunity is of course a federalism-based limit on federal legislative
power.
Justice Holmes, writing for the majority in Missouri v. Holland, said,
among other things, that the Treaty Power is not limited by any
"invisible radiation from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment."7'
The Eleventh Amendment is, of course, not "invisible," nor is it part of
the Tenth Amendment. But, as has often been noted, the text of the
Eleventh Amendment covers far less ground than does the constitutional
doctrine of state sovereign immunity contemplated in such cases as
Seminole Tribe and Alden. The Court has made it clear that the Eleventh
Amendment reflects a preexisting principle of sovereign immunity that
is far broader than that described in the Amendment's text. It has said
that the term "Eleventh Amendment immunity" is merely shorthand for
this broader, preexisting immunity.72 To the extent that state sovereign
immunity goes beyond the text of that Amendment, it might be
described as an "invisible radiation" of our Constitution. Although one
might argue that it is a radiation from the Eleventh rather than the Tenth
that Union Gas should be limited to the Interstate Commerce Clause and not extended to the
Indian Commerce Clause, the Court emphasized that the States "have been divested of virtually
all authority over Indian Commerce and Indian tribes." 517 U.S. at 62. The Court held,
nevertheless, that the States' "virtually total cessation of authority over [Indian commerce]" did
not include "cessation of immunity from suit." Id; see also id. at 72 (stating that, "[e]ven when
the Constitution vests in Congress complete lawmaking authority over a particular area, the
Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by private parties against
unconsenting States"). Having overruled Union Gas's holding that Congress may abrogate
pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause, the Court gave no reason for extending that holding
to the Indian Commerce Clause, despite the concededly greater federal interest in the latter
clause, other than the fact that both clauses predated the Eleventh Amendment. Similarly, in
holding in Florida Prepaid that Congress may not abrogate pursuant to the Patent Clause, the
Court offered no reason other than that it had held in Seminole Tribe that Congress may not
abrogate state sovereign immunity under Article I. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 636 (1999). The Spending Clause is not a counter-
example, as that clause merely empowers Congress to encourage waivers of immunity; such
waivers are consistent with, rather than an abrogation of, state sovereign immunity. I agree with
Bandes that the chronological line the Court has drawn is highly problematic, see Vdzquez, supra
note 29, at 1749-50, but it seems to me that Bandes's interpretation of these cases as embracing a
clause-specific inquiry amounts to wishful thinking.
70. 1 have done this myself. See Vdzquez, supra note 4, at 1343.
71. 252U.S. at434.
72. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 713. 1 use the term in this sense in the title of this article.
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Amendment, it is probably more accurate to say that the Eleventh
Amendment is a reflection of the broader doctrine of state sovereign
immunity. The doctrine of state sovereign immunity might thus be
regarded as an invisible radiation from the Tenth Amendment, the
catch-all federalism clause. Indeed, scholars have argued that the state
sovereign immunity decision in Alden is merely one facet of the Court's
anti-commandeering jurisprudence,73 which is in turn widely regarded
as an invisible radiation from the Tenth Amendment.
The doctrinal case for a treaty-based abrogation power can be
buttressed by a structural argument. Treaties require the consent of two-
thirds of the Senate, the branch of the government most responsive to
state interests. Thus, just as the Constitution provides the states with a
structural safeguard against infringement of their regulatory jurisdiction,
it also protects them structurally from being subjected to federal
remedies for the violation of such regulations. Evidence of the efficacy
of this safeguard can be found in the federalism understandings that the
Senate has insisted on attaching to numerous treaties the United States
has recently ratified, primarily, though not exclusively, those relating to
human rights."
To the doctrinal and structural arguments might be added an
argument based on original intent. The Founders were united in their
concern about state violations of treaties during the era of the Articles of
Confederation. The inability of the federal government to deter or
remedy such violations was one of the principal vices of the Articles of
Confederation and a principal animating cause of the Founders'
decision to write a new Constitution. As Judge Gibbons has argued, 78
the Founders' clear intent to establish a governmental system that would
be effective at deterring and correcting state violations of treaties of the
United States makes it highly unlikely that they intended states to be
73. See, e.g., Richard Seamon, The Sovereign Immunity of States in Their Own Courts, 37
BRANDEIS L.J. 319 (1999); John Allotta, Note, Alden v. Maine: Infusing Tenth Amendment and
General Federalism Principles into Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudence, 51 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 505 (2001).
74. Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), § 102(c)(1), 108 Stat. 4818, 19 U.S.C. §§
3512(b)(2)(A), 3512(c)(1); see also "Statement of Administrative Action" (SAA), reprinted in
H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, at 656, 675-677 (1994).
75. See 530 U.S. 363, 386 & n.24 (2000).
76. See generally Christopher McCrudden, International Economic Law and the Pursuit of
Human Rights: A Framework for Discussion of the Legality of 'Selective Purchasing' Laws
Under the WTO Government Procurement Agreement, 2 J. INT'L ECON. L. 3 (1999).
77. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
78. See generally John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity:
A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1889 (1983).
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immune from suits arising under treaties.
Finally, one can make a straightforward policy argument in support
of a treaty-based abrogation power. Although it is important that the
states comply with their obligations under federal statutes, compliance
with treaties is arguably even more important. Violation of a statute
results in the loss of whatever domestic benefit Congress intended to
advance when it passed the statute. Violation of treaties produces
problems of a different order entirely. Violations of treaties have an
effect on the nation's reputation for keeping its promises, thus making it
more difficult to conclude other treaties. This problem was a particular
concern of the Founders. The states' violations of the peace treaty with
Great Britain was cited by that country to excuse its own violations of
the treaty and as a reason not to conclude a treaty of commerce with the
United States.79
Moreover, treaty violations are violations of international law. As
such, they subject the nation as a whole to retaliation by the offended
foreign nations. The Founders were concerned that violations of treaties
could lead to war."° The risk of war as a result of treaty violations seems
more remote today; the United States, as the world's superpower, is less
vulnerable to military or other forms of pressure than the nation was at
the time of the Founding. Nevertheless, it is still largely true that
violation of promises made to other nations by treaty is of potentially far
greater concern to the nation than violation of commitments made to
private parties through legislation, as foreign states remain, for the most
part, more powerful adversaries than private parties whose rights are
violated by the states. Because, under international law, such retaliation
need not be directly related to the violation that precipitated it, treaty
violations place at risk interests of the United States not directly related
to the treaty. For example, the United States' violation of an obligation
to provide consular notification might result not just in the denial of the
corresponding right to U.S. citizens, but also in the violation by other
states of international legal duties having nothing to do with consular
notification. Because manifold national interests are placed at risk when
a state violates a treaty, it might be argued, Congress must have the
power to take steps to remedy violations of treaties by the states,
including the creation of judicial remedies. This sort of argument has
often been advanced to support a total exclusion of states from the
foreign relations area."' Although the broad exclusion of states from
79. See id. at 1918.
80. See Vdzquez, supra note 56, at 1103.
81. See Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223 (1999)
2002]
HeinOnline  -- 42 Va. J. Int'l L. 729 2001-2002
730 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
matters international may be difficult to maintain in this era of
globalization, when practically any activity has international
ramifications," the argument may nevertheless support a distinction
between statutes and treaties for purposes of abrogation of state
sovereign immunity.
The appeal of the pro-abrogation position is enhanced by the
weakness of the case for a doctrine of state sovereign immunity that
applies at all to federal claims. As noted, the prevailing view among
scholars is that the Eleventh Amendment merely withdraws one
diversity basis of federal jurisdiction, leaving untouched the arising
under grant, and that state sovereign immunity is at best a common law
doctrine subject to plenary repeal by Congress under any of its
legislative powers. Four members of the Court are committed to this
view. At least some of the five members who adhere to Hans have
explained that they view the question of Hans's correctness as an
original matter as a difficult question, but that they nevertheless adhere
to Hans for stare decisis reasons. If the case for adhering to Hans, and
thus for concluding that state sovereign immunity applies to federal
claims at all, rests on stare decisis, then the case for declining to extend
the decision to the Treaty Power would appear to be at its strongest.83
Indeed, if the Court has yet to rule that state sovereign immunity applies
to exercises of the Treaty Power, then the anti-abrogation position is not
even supported by stare decisis. In the absence of countervailing
arguments, the arguments outlined above would appear to be sufficient
to support the conclusion that Congress has the power to abrogate state
sovereign immunity pursuant to the Treaty Power.
B. The Weakness of the Case For a Treaty-Based Abrogation
Power
Before presenting the countervailing arguments, I shall offer a brief
rebuttal of some of the pro-abrogation arguments. First, the doctrinal
support in Missouri v. Holland is weak. As discussed in Part II,
Missouri is best understood as a holding that the limits on congressional
power found in the various clauses of Article I, Section 8 are not
applicable to Congress's Treaty Power, as the latter is a wholly separate
head of power with limits of its own. This should be no more
(offering rebuttal of such arguments).
82. See Berman, Reese & Young, supra note 13, at 1189.
83. See Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, Night and Day: Coeur d'Alene, Breard, and the Unraveling
of the Prospective-Retrospective Distinction in Eleventh Amendment Doctrine, 87 GEO. L.J. 1, 88
(1998).
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controversial than a recognition that the limits of the Commerce Power
do not apply to the Patent Power or the Bankruptcy Power. It does not
follow that general limitations found elsewhere in the Constitution do
not apply to the Treaty Power. For example, the Constitution provides
that "[a]ll bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of
Representatives."' This provision obviously applies whether the Bill is
an exercise of the Commerce Power or some other Article I power. It is
generally agreed that this limit applies as well to exercises of the Treaty
Power.85 .For similar reasons, Missouri need not be read to exempt the
Treaty Power from the generally applicable limits reflected in the Tenth
or Eleventh Amendments. I have argued elsewhere that the anti-
commandeering principle of Printz and New York may well apply to the
Treaty Power. The case for applying the doctrine of state sovereign
immunity is even stronger.
It is true that some commentators have made broad statements
suggesting that Missouri v. Holland stands for the proposition that there
are no federalism-based limits on the Treaty Power. These comments,
however, were made in the context of discussions of Congress's power
to implement treaties regulating individuals, and clearly were not meant
to address the applicability of federalism-based limits such as state
sovereign immunity. This is true, at least, of the broad statement made
by me. I once wrote that, in the light of Missouri v. Holland, "it appears
that there are no limits on the treaty power grounded in state
sovereignty."86 That this was an overstatement when made is apparent,
given the conclusion I, reached in that article that the anti-
commandeering rule of New York v. United States and Printz v. United
States might well limit the Treaty Power.87 Indeed, it is an overstatement
insofar as one can regard the requirement of consent by two-thirds of
the Senate as a federalism-based limit. What I should have said is that
Missouri v. Holland holds that the Treaty Power places no judicially
enforceable federalism-based subject-matter limits on Congress's
power to regulate individuals..
It is also true that the Court in Missouri v. Holland suggested that the
Treaty Power is not limited by invisible radiations from the Tenth
Amendment. But to conclude that the Court meant to say that the Treaty
Power is exempt from all non-textual federalism limitations is a stretch.
84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
85. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
111 cmt. i.
86. Vdzquez, supra note 4, at 1343.
87. Id. at 1360.
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The Court apparently meant to refer to, and reject, the claim that the
Tenth Amendment carves out certain spheres for exclusive state
regulation, whether or not they would otherwise fall within an
enumerated power. If the Court meant to go further, the statement
would to that extent be pure dictum. I have never regarded the statement
as a strong basis for concluding that the anti-commandeering doctrine is
inapplicable to exercises of the Treaty Power, and I regard it as even
less of an obstacle to the conclusion that the Treaty Power is subject to
the doctrine of state sovereign immunity.
There is some force to the policy argument that relies on the idea that
compliance with treaties is more important than compliance with
statutes. It was for similar reasons that some Founders took the position
that a later statute should not trump an earlier inconsistent treaty.88 The
doctrine that prevails today, however, is to the contrary. It is well
established that, in the event of a conflict between a statute and a treaty,
the last in time prevails. Statutes and treaties are lexically equivalent.
The last-in-time rule makes it difficult to defend the pro-abrogation
position on the theory that compliance with treaties is categorically
more important than compliance with statutes. Indeed, a plurality of the
Court drew precisely the opposite inference from the last-in-time rule in
Reid v. Covert. In concluding that Congress's power to implement
treaties was subject to "constitutional prohibitions" such as those found
in the Bill of Rights, the plurality reasoned that "[i]t would be
completely anomalous to say that a treaty need not comply with the
Constitution when such an agreement can be overridden by a statute that
must conform to that instrument."89
The structural argument relying on the constitutional requirement that
treaties receive the consent of two-thirds of the Senate is stronger. It
might support the conclusion that the Treaty Power is not constrained
by state sovereign immunity if the latter doctrine were supported only
by judicial precedent not quite on point and if there were no
countervailing arguments. In my view, however, there is a strong
countervailing argument based on constitutional text. This
countervailing argument rebuts as well the argument based on original
intent. Discussion of this countervailing argument will show, further,
that the policy arguments for a congressional power to abrogate state
sovereign immunity are weaker than they appear.
It is true that one of the principal vices of the Articles of
88. See Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy
and International Law, 71 VA. L. REv. 1071, 1099 (1985) (describing position of John Jay).
89. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957) (plurality opinion).
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Confederation, in the view of the Founders, was the lack of any
mechanism for enforcing state compliance with treaties. The Founders
were very concerned about such violations, and they clearly intended to
establish a federal governmental with the power to prevent such
violations or remedy them if they should occur. But the mechanism they
adopted for this purpose consisted of the Supremacy Clause, which
provides that treaties "shall be the supreme Law of the Land" and
instructs the judges in every state to give them effect, and Article III,
which authorizes federal jurisdiction over claims arising under treaties.
Significantly, these provisions of the Constitution make no distinction
between statutes and treaties. The texts of the Constitution that most
directly address the role of courts in enforcing treaties thus strongly
support the conclusion that this role is the same with respect to treaties
and statutes.
Indeed, Judge Gibbons's examination of the Founders' intent to avoid
state violations of treaties led him to conclude that the Eleventh
Amendment does not apply to any federal claims."° He argued based on
this history that the Amendment should instead be read to withdraw a
diversity basis for jurisdiction, leaving intact the federal question
provision, which provides for federal jurisdiction over cases arising
under the Constitution and federal statutes and treaties alike. If the
Supremacy Clause and Article III support the (as yet) unsuccessful
effort to convince the Court to adopt the diversity view, these
constitutional texts also pose a significant obstacle to any attempt to
distinguish treaties from statutes for purposes of state sovereign
immunity.
IV. THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE AND STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
As I have written elsewhere, the relationship between the Supremacy
Clause and state sovereign immunity doctrine is underappreciated.9" The
principal problem with the Eleventh Amendment, insofar as it applies to
federal claims, is the tension between the doctrine of state immunity and
the supremacy of federal law. State sovereign immunity constrains the
courts' ability to enforce the undoubted federal obligations of the states.
The diversity theory, as defended by some scholars and Justices, seeks
to alleviate this tension.
The Court majority that has until now rejected the diversity theory
has not denied the importance of the supremacy of federal law. Instead,
90. Gibbons, supra note 78.
91. Vzquez, supra note 29, at 1777-85.
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it has decided to retain the Hans interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment because, in its view, the doctrine does not impair such
supremacy. Thus, in Union Gas, Justice Scalia spoke for four of the
current five Justices that comprise the majority on Eleventh Amendment
issues when he said that, "undoubtedly, the Constitution envisions the
necessary judicial means to assure compliance [by the states] with the
Constitution and laws."'92 The Eleventh Amendment, in his view, is not
inconsistent with this proposition. That is because the Amendment does
not preclude the judicial enforcement of federal law at the behest of the
federal government, or in suits by private parties seeking prospective
relief against state officials or seeking damages from such officials.
The case law relating to suits for prospective relief relies explicitly on
the Supremacy Clause. The seminal case ofExparte Young relies on the
Supremacy Clause in explaining why the Eleventh Amendment is not a
bar to a suit against a state officer alleging the officer is violating
federal law:
The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional, and if it
be so, the use of the name of the State to enforce an
unconstitutional act to the injury of complainants is a proceeding
without the authority of and one which does not affect the State
in its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an illegal
act upon the part of a state official in attempting by the use of the
name of the State to enforce a legislative enactment which is
void because unconstitutional. If the act which the state Attorney
General seeks to enforce be a violation of the Federal
Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such enactment
comes into conflict with the superior authority of that
Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or
representative character and is subjected in his person to the
consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power
to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the
supreme authority of the United States.93
This was no innovation. The role of the Supremacy Clause as the
basis of the remedy against individual officers had earlier been made
clear in Poindexter v. Greenhow:
Of what avail are written constitutions whose bills of right for the
security of individual liberty have been written, too often, with
the blood of martyrs shed upon the battle-field and the scaffold,
92. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 33 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
93. 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908).
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if their limitations and restraints upon power may be overpassed
with impunity by the very agencies created and appointed to
guard, defend, and enforce them... And how else can these
principles of individual liberty and right be maintained, if, when
violated, the judicial tribunals are forbidden to visit penalties
upon individual offenders, who are the instruments of wrong,
whenever they interpose the shield of the State? The doctrine is
not to be tolerated. The whole frame and scheme of the political
constitutions of this country, State and Federal, protest against it.
Their continued existence is not compatible with it. It is the
doctrine of absolutism, pure, simple, and naked; and of
communism, which is its twin; the double progeny of the same
evil birth. ... [The Constitution] creates a government in fact, as
well as in name, because its Constitution is the supreme law of
the land, "anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the
contrary notwithstanding;" and its authority is enforced by its
power to regulate and govern the conduct of individuals, even
where its prohibitions are laid only upon the States themselves.
The mandate of the State affords no justification for the invasion
of rights secured by the Constitution of the United States;
otherwise, that Constitution would not be the supreme law of the
land.94
The Court continues to recognize the Supremacy Clause as the basis
of this line of cases. In Pennhurst State School and Hospital v.
Halderman, for example, the Court wrote that
"Ex parte Young was the culmination of efforts by this Court to
harmonize the principles of the Eleventh Amendment with the
effective supremacy of rights and powers secured elsewhere in
the Constitution." Our decisions repeatedly have emphasized that
the Young doctrine rests'on the need to promote the vindication
of federal rights.95
The Court accordingly held that the Ex parte Young doctrine authorizes
prospective relief against state officers only where the officer is alleged
to have violated federal law.
The Court similarly cited the Supremacy Clause as the justification
for awards of prospective relief, notwithstanding the Eleventh
Amendment, in Green v. Mansour: "[T]he availability of prospective
relief of the sort awarded in Ex parte Young gives life to the Supremacy
94. 114 U.S. 270, 291-92 (1885).
95. 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984).
2002]
HeinOnline  -- 42 Va. J. Int'l L. 735 2001-2002
736 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Clause. Remedies designed to end a continuing violation of federal law
are necessary to vindicate the federal interest in assuring the supremacy
of that law.
9 6
I have cited these cases and others as support for a reading of the
Supremacy Clause as the source of a self-executing constitutional law of
remedies for the violation of federal law,97 the source not only. of
prospective relief against state and federal officials, but also of
monetary relief against such officials.98 As this paper is not about self-
execution, however, it suffices here to maintain that the Supremacy
Clause (in conjunction with the Necessary and Proper Clause) is at least
the source of a congressional power to establish effective remedies for
the violation of federal law. it is, in other words, the source of the
principle that "the Constitution envisions the necessary judicial means
to assure compliance with the Constitution and laws,"" at least if
Congress authorizes those means.
As noted above, Justice Scalia and his colleagues-who decided to
adhere to Hans did so even while acknowledging that the question of its
correctness was not free from doubt. They adhered to' it in large part for
reasons of stare decisis, reasoning that its effects were not so bad from
the perspective of federal supremacy. In particular, they concluded that
the Eleventh Amendment as construed in Hans was not inconsistent
with the constitutional need for "judicial means to assure compliance
[by the states] with the Constitution and laws" because the Amendment
left available effective methods of enforcing these obligations in court.
Specifically, the Court mentioned not only suits for prospective relief
against state officials, but also suits by the United States for any form of
relief and personal-capacity suits against individual officers by private
parties. '0
In a pre-Alden article anticipating the holdings of Alden and Florida
Prepaid, I described at some length the remedies that would remain
available for enforcing patent rights against states.10° I concluded that
the problems created by these decisions would not be severe as long as
suits by the federal government and private suits for prospective relief
96. 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985).
97. See Vfzquez, supra note 29, at 1777-1785; Carlos Manuel VdZquez, The Constitution as
Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and Constitutional Remedies (unpublished manuscript,
on file with The Virginia Journal of International Law).
98. Cf. Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L.
REv. 289 (1995).
99. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 33 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
100. 491 U.S. at 33-34.
101. Vdzquez, supra note 29, at 1790-1804.
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and personal capacity damage suits remained available. °2 In post-Alden
articles, I and others have elaborated on this question.0 3 An extensive
analysis of the remedies these decisions leave open seems unnecessary,
but a brief discussion of the avenues left open by the Eleventh
Amendment might help dispel some of the concerns that underlie the
policy argument in favor of a treaty-based abrogation power.
First, it is important to recall that the Eleventh Amendment does not
limit the federal government's power to impose primary obligations on
the States. It merely denies the federal government the power to give
efficacy to those obligations by subjecting States to certain forms of
remedial obligations. Thus, the Eleventh Amendment does not call into
question the states' obligation not to infringe patent rights, or their
obligation to afford arrested aliens of their right to consult with their
consuls."° There are constitutional limits on the federal government's
power to impose obligations on the states, but these limits do not have
their basis in the doctrine of state sovereign immunity. 5
If a treaty imposes primary obligations on states, but does not
specifically address remedial issues, then Congress would be free to
create a wide array of remedies even if the Eleventh Amendment
applied.0 6 Congress would be able to authorize suits against the states
by the federal government, as Eleventh Amendment immunity is
inapplicable to such suits. Congress would also be able to authorize
suits for prospective relief against state officers who are violating
obligations imposed by treaties. Congress could also authorize suits for
damages against state officers who have violated treaty-based
obligations. Under current doctrine, state officials are entitled to a
qualified immunity which protects them from damage liability unless
they violated clearly established federal law, but this immunity is
widely regarded as sub-constitutional and thus alterable by Congress.0 7
102. Id.
103. See Berman, Reese & Young, supra note 13; Menell, supra note 13; Carlos Manuel
Vdzquez, Sovereign Immunity, Due Process, and the Alden Trilogy, 109 YALE L.J. 1927 (2000);
Carlos Manuel Vd.zquez, Eleventh Amendment Schizophrenia, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 859
(2000) [hereinafter Vdzquez, Schizophrenia].
104. The latter right is conferred by article 36(l) of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
105. For a discussion of these limits and their applicability to the Treaty Power, see Vzquez,
supra note 4.
106. Some of these remedies may be available even without affirmative congressional action.
See generally Vdzquez, supra note 56, at 1141-61. Here, I consider the more limited question of
Congress's power to create remedies to give efficacy to treaties. For a more complete discussion
of the remedies not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, see Vdzquez, Schizophrenia, supra note
103; VAzquez, supra note 29, at 1790-1804.
107. But see infra note 114.
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The only suits effectively barred by state sovereign immunity are
suits brought by private parties or foreign states or Indian tribes seeking
damages against the states themselves. °8 I doubt that the absence of this
remedy could be said to contravene a treaty that imposes primary
obligations on states but does not address remedial issues, or one that
addresses remedial issues in a general manner, such as by requiring
unspecified "effective" or "enforceable" remedies. Even a treaty that
specifically requires that states make available an "enforceable right to
compensation"1"9 may be satisfied by a private right of action for
damages against state officers, as opposed to the state itself.
In the unlikely event that a treaty specifically required that private
parties be granted a right to damages from state governments, as
opposed to state officials, Congress would be able to implement the
treaty, without running afoul of the Eleventh Amendment, by
empowering the federal government to bring suit on behalf of such
individuals seeking damages from the states. That such suits are
permitted by the Eleventh Amendment appears to be a settled aspect of
the Court's state sovereign immunity jurisprudence."' If a treaty for
some reason required that private parties have the power to initiate and
prosecute the action, Congress would be able to satisfy that obligation
by assuming the liability itself, waiving its own sovereign immunity to
permit private parties to sue it to recover the amount for which states
would be liable under the treaty, and subsequently seeking
reimbursement from the state. In the exceedingly unlikely event that a
treaty specifically required that the state government as opposed to the
federal government be held liable, the United States could, as a last
resort, ratify the treaty with a reservation making it clear that states
would not themselves be subject to suit by private parties, but
alternative remedies would be provided. It is difficult to conceive of a
situation in which such a reservation would be invalid because contrary
to the object and purpose of the treaty."'
In short, according to the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment
108. On whether suits against state officials seeking non-monetary relief is barred, see
generally V6zquez, supra note 83.
109. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 9(5), Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.
110. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2269; Vdzquez, Schizophrenia, supra note 103, at 870-71 &
n.52. But see United States v. Mississippi Dept. Pub. Safety, 159 F. Supp. 2d 374 (S.D. Miss.
2001) (suit by United States seeking compensation for private parties barred by the Eleventh
Amendment).
111. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 19(c), opened for signature May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (reservation to treaty invalid under international law if incompatible
with the object and purpose of the treaty).
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does not bar the remedies that that are necessary to ensure state
compliance with the primary obligations imposed on it by supreme
federal law.'12 To the extent the Amendment were interpreted
consistently with this principle, the policy arguments discussed above
for a treaty-based abrogation power would not be compelling. That
violations of treaties are of greater concern to the nation than violations
of statutes, and that dissing foreign states is more dangerous to the
nation than dissing private litigants, would be beside the point because
the Eleventh Amendment would not be producing violations of treaties.
V. DEPARTURES FROM THE SUPREMACY IDEAL
If the Court's jurisprudence of state sovereign immunity is based on
the recognition that the Constitution envisions the necessary judicial
means for assuring compliance by the states with their federal
obligations, then a distinction between statutes and treaties seems
unnecessary for the reasons discussed in Part IV. The textual basis for
such a principle in the Supremacy Clause provides strong support for
applying the same rule in the two contexts, and, in any event, a remedy
would be barred on this view only if it were unnecessary. Numerous
commentators have argued that the doctrine of state sovereign immunity
does in fact preclude remedies that are necessary for the effective
enforcement of federal laws." 3 If so, the appropriate response would
appear to be to argue that state sovereign immunity doctrine should be
reformulated because it is inconsistent with the Court's own standard,
which calls for the availability of the judicial means necessary to assure
112. David Golove has suggested to me that the potential problem with applying the Eleventh
Amendment to the Treaty Power is not that it frustrates the ability of the United States to comply
with its treaty obligations, but rather in that it limits the power of the treaty-makers to make
potentially beneficial treaties in the first place. Of course, if I am right about the applicability of
state sovereign immunity principles to exercises of the Treaty Power, the treaty-makers should
not conclude treaties that specifically call for remedies that the Eleventh Amendment would bar.
Still, I think it is fair to say that the question I address in this article primarily concerns the ability
of the nation to ensure compliance with its treaty obligations. Historically, treaties have not
addressed the question of domestic judicial remedies, at least not with any specificity.
International law has concerned itself with the parties' compliance with their primary obligations,
and left the question of domestic remedies to the states-parties. Although this has been changing
to some extent, treaties that address domestic judicial remedies remain the exception and not the
rule. Moreover, few treaties address such remedies in any detail, and even when they do address
the issue, the remedial provisions are typically of secondary importance.
113. See, e.g., Daniel Meltzer, Overcoming Immunity: The Case of Federal Regulation of
Intellectual Property, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1331 (2001). On the effectiveness of the remedies not
barred by the Eleventh Amendment, see generally Vdzquez, Schizophrenia, supra note 103, at
870-88; Vdzquez, supra note 29, at 1790-1804.
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compliance with federal obligations.
Of greater concern is language in some recent decisions suggesting
that the Court is departing from the view that the Eleventh Amendment
does not bar the judicial means necessary to assure compliance by the
states with their federal obligations. There have been suggestions, for
example, that the federal obligations of the states may ultimately depend
for their efficacy on the states' good faith.14 This approach may lead the
court to cut back on some of the mechanisms now available to enforce
the federal obligations of the states. These suggestions are profoundly
troubling. They are inconsistent with the Founders' recognition that
obligations that rely for their efficacy on the good faith of the obligor
are not legal obligations at all. Indeed, one of the principal lessons the
Founders learned from the critical period was that reliance on the states'
good faith was insufficient-the states could not be trusted to comply
with their federal obligations without compulsion." 5
Even if the Court were to move in this direction, however, exempting
treaty-based claims from the limitations imposed by state sovereign
immunity doctrine would be inappropriate. Such a move would be as
troubling with respect to statutes as with respect to treaties. An
exemption for treaties would be an unsatisfying half-measure which
would obscure the true nature of the problem. The fundamental problem
would be a conflict between the doctrine of state sovereign immunity
and the Supremacy Clause. That clause treats statutes and treaties
equivalently. Retaining a symmetry between statutes and treaties with
114. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2266. For a discussion of the Court's departures from the
supremacy standard, and additional departures that we might expect in the future, see Vdzquez,
Schizophrenia, supra note 103. I suggest there, among other things, that the Court may be on the
verge of constitutionalizing the doctrine of official immunity. 1d. at 900-08. Thus, while the
statement by Berman, Reese & Young that "[t]here is no doubt that [removal of the official
immunity enjoyed by state officials] lies within Congress's power," see Berman, Reese &
Young, supra note 13, at 1127, may be true as a description of current doctrine, see also Vdzquez,
supra note 29, at 1798-99 (suggesting such a measure), it may not be true for long. But see
Meltzer, supra note 113, at 1359 n.97 (expressing skepticism of my prediction).
115. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, supra note 27, at 149:
There was a time when we were told that breaches by the States of the regulations of
the federal authority were not to be expected; that a sense of common interest would
preside over the conduct of the respective members, and would beget a full compliance
with all the constitutional requisitions of the Union. This language, at the present day,
would appear as wild as a great part of what we now hear from the same quarter will be
thought, when we shall have received further lessons from that best oracle of wisdom,
experience. It at all times betrayed an ignorance of the true springs by which human
conduct is actuated, and belied the original inducements to the establishment of civil
power. Why has government been instituted at all? Because the passions of men will not
conform to the dictates of reason and justice without constraint.
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respect to state sovereign immunity is more faithful to the constitutional
scheme, and would make it more likely that the problem would
eventually be resolved with respect to both.
CONCLUSION
I have argued here that state sovereign immunity doctrine is fully
applicable to exercises of the Treaty Power. The Court maintains that its
recent Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence is compatible with the
supremacy of federal law because it leaves available the necessary
judicial means for assuring state compliance with their federal
obligations. If so, then applying this doctrine to the Treaty Power will
not undermine the important national interest in treaty compliance. On
the other hand, if the Court departs from the supremacy ideal, then, as
Susan Bandes accurately describes my position, "the difference between
treaties and statutes becomes the least of our problems.. ' . 6 Exempting
treaties from the Eleventh Amendment would be an unsatisfying half-
measure that might indeed delay a more satisfying solution to the
problem.
For similar reasons, I have argued elsewhere that the anti-
commandeering doctrine, too, may well apply to exercises of the Treaty
Power. Nevertheless, I have defended the holding of Missouri v.
Holland. My position may thus be summarized as follows: Missouri v.
Holland stands for the proposition that there are no federalism-based
subject-matter limitations on the power of Congress to regulate
individuals pursuant to the Treaty Power. Such regulation is valid as
long as it implements a valid treaty (meaning a treaty that does not
contravene any affirmative prohibition in the Constitution) that has
received the consent of two-thirds of the Senate. The Court may have to
articulate a "nexus" requirement: that is, the implementing statute would
have to bear some specified relationship to the treaty. Perhaps a statute
would be regarded as a valid implementation of the treaty only if the
treaty required the enactment of the statute. Such a requirement would
depart from the analysis in Missouri v. Holland, but some such
departure may be justified.
When the Congress imposes primary obligations on the states
(including state officials), the relevant line of cases is the New York-
Printz-Condon line of cases. There are many uncertainties about the
limits this line of cases imposes of Congress. It is, indeed, because of
116. Bandes, supra note 69, at 755.
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these uncertainties that the applicability of this line of cases to the
Treaty Power remains uncertain. 117
It is certain, however, that Congress has the power to impose some
primary obligations on states pursuant to numerous Article I powers,
including the power to implement treaties. State sovereign immunity
issues arise when primary obligations have been validly imposed on
states pursuant to treaties, or statutes implementing treaties. My
conclusion in this article is that, even when Congress or the treaty-
makers possess the power to impose primary obligations on the states,
state sovereign immunity limits the remedies to which the states may be
subjected. Congress may not subject the states to suit by private parties,
foreign states, or Indian tribes, whether for prospective or retrospective
relief. Congress may, however, authorize suits against the states by the
federal government, and it may subject state officials to suit for
prospective relief and for damages payable by them personally.
A treaty that would require a remedy against the states themselves, as
distinguished from their officials, could not be complied with. Few
treaties address domestic remedies, however, and even fewer are so
specific as to require remedies against the state itself as opposed to
officials. More common are treaties that simply require the parties to
make effective remedies available. Thus, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights provides that "[a]nyone who has been the
victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to
compensation," without specifying whether the compensation is to
come from the state or state officials."' A treaty that would require the
provision of judicial remedies against the state itself as opposed to its
officials should not be ratified without reservations. The availability of
alternative remedies makes it unlikely that such a reservation would be
invalid under international law on the ground that it is "incompatible
with the object and purpose of the treaty.""' 9
117. See generally Vdzquez, supra note 4.
118. Dec. 16, 1966, art. 9(5), 999 UNT.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.
119. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 19(c), opened for signature May 23,
1969, 1155 UNT.S. 331 (reservation to treaty invalid under international law if incompatible with
the object and purpose of the treaty).
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